【聯合報╱By EDUARDO PORTER╱陳世欽譯】
Globalization’s Evolving Picture
Not long ago, executives at the Dutch multinational Royal DSM, a maker of nutritional supplements and high-tech materials, used to require a battery of internal studies to decide where to do a deal or locate a new manufacturing plant. But today, “we won’t even do the study,” said Stephan B. Tanda , who is responsible for the Americas. “It’s clear it will be the United States.”
The United States, he said, has lots of cheap natural gas and a very lightly regulated labor market. At the same time, China, where Royal DSM has some 40 plants, is losing its edge. “It is less attractive than it used to be as a source from which to serve the world,” Mr. Tanda said. For the last time the United States was as competitive as it is now, he added, “you have to go back to before the first oil shock in the 1970s.” Of the $3.6 billion in acquisitions by Royal DSM since 2010, 80 percent has been in the United States.
Could globalization make a U-turn?
Over the last year or two, a growing number of business analysts have been arguing that we are entering a new era of global manufacturing, with the United States at center stage.
Last month, the Boston Consulting Group, a business advising firm, said the United States had the lowest manufacturing costs among major exporters in the developed world and was nearly competitive with China.
But before becoming overly excited about the prospects for an American industrial renaissance, it is worth looking more skeptically at the claim that globalization has run its course.
“I don’t agree that China’s moment is coming to an end,” said Karl P. Sauvant at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. “The most important determinant of investment is market size and market growth, and China remains a big market and continues to grow at a reasonable pace.”
So what if workers in China’s coastal areas are becoming more expensive? The country will make more sophisticated stuff. Indeed, countries tend to trade more as their incomes converge, not less. Manufacturers seeking cheap labor still have plenty of places to go, like Vietnam, Bangladesh, Mexico or even China’s heavily populated hinterland, which will benefit from Beijing’s huge investments in infrastructure connecting it to the coast.
There are dynamics that could put a real dent in globalization. If energy prices take off again, that will favor regional rather than global production networks. Intellectual property piracy in China might temper multinational corporations’ appetite to invest in advanced industries there.
Technologies that allow fewer workers to perform more sophisticated tasks — 3-D printing, say — might encourage more production in rich countries, near consumer markets.
Already, slow growth is undermining the case for open markets that globalization rests on. Trade has slowed significantly since the Great Recession. Protectionist measures have multiplied as countries have sought to protect domestic producers.
Perhaps China’s rising costs will finally provide a break to American workers who have been losing ground for two decades to a once-bottomless pool of cheap workers.
Still, Richard Baldwin of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva said the convergence in incomes driven by the fast industrialization of China and some other countries like Brazil and India is unlikely to stop soon. In 1988, the share of world income held by the seven richest nations peaked at two-thirds. By 2010 it was down to half. It is, Mr. Baldwin proposes, “likely to continue to sag for decades.”
Evidence that globalization might be going into reverse is hard to find in the data. Global foreign direct investment flows remain substantially below the record $2 trillion of 2007. But last year they rebounded 9 percent, to $1.45 trillion, according to United Nations data. More than half went to developing countries and China received $124 billion, nearly a record and roughly 50 percent more than six years ago.
Even if the United States draws a larger share of global manufacturing, lots of highwage jobs are unlikely to follow.
James B. Rice Jr. and Francesco Stefanelli at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology looked at some 50 American companies that have said they were bringing jobs home. Most have yet to make any move. Mr. Rice said, “We don’t think that’s really what’s happening.”
不斷變化的全球化面貌
荷蘭皇家帝斯曼公司(DSM)是生產營養補充品與各種高科技材料的跨國企業,高級主管一向依賴內部研究決定在哪裡找生意或設廠。該公司負責美洲區業務的譚達表示,如今,「我們甚至不再做這種研究。顯然一定是美國」。
他說,美國擁有可觀的廉價天然氣與管理寬鬆的勞力市場。在此同時,皇家DSM大約設有40座工廠的中國大陸已經開始失去它的優勢。譚達說:「作為一個服務全球市場的基點而言,中國大陸的吸引力已經不如以往。」他又說,美國上一次競爭力與今天相同的時期是「1970年代的第一次石油危機之前」。在皇家DSM2010年至今執行的36億美元收購案當中,有80%在美國。
全球化會不會逆轉?
過去這一、二年,越來越多的分析師認為,我們已經進入一個新的全球製造時代,而美國是核心。
波士頓顧問集團上個月表示,美國的製造成本在已開發世界主要出口國之中是最低的,競爭力接近中國大陸。
然而在對美國工業復興的前景過於樂觀之前,我們宜乎以更懷疑的態度看待所謂全球化進程已經走到盡頭的說法。
哥倫比亞永續投資中心的索凡特說:「我不同意中國大陸獨領風騷的時代已經結束的看法。市場規模與市場成長是投資的最重要決定因素。中國大陸仍然是龐大的市場,而且以合理的速度持續成長。」
如果中國大陸沿海地區的勞力成本提高,局面會如何?大陸一定會生產更精密的商品。的確,如果勞工的收入逐漸接近,各國間貿易往往增加而非減少。尋找廉價勞力的企業還有許多地方可去,如越南、孟加拉、墨西哥甚至人口稠密的中國大陸內地。後者將因為北京對連接它與沿海地帶的基礎建設挹注重資而受益。
有些因素可能影響全球化。如果能源價格再度上漲,必然有利區域而非全球的生產網絡。中國大陸對智財權的侵害可能影響跨國企業在當地投資先進工業的意願。
使更少的勞工得以執行更精密工作的科技,例如3D列印,可能促使更多產品在鄰近消費市場的富國製造。
成長緩慢已經開始影響全球化所繫的開放市場主張。大衰退出現後,貿易大減。各國為保護本國製造商而相繼採取保護主義措施。
中國大陸勞力成本提高或許終於讓美國勞工有了喘息的機會。20年來美國勞工始終不敵曾經無限供應的中國大陸廉價勞力。
然而日內瓦高級國際關係及發展學院的鮑德文表示,中國大陸、巴西、印度等國迅速邁向工業化促成的勞工收入漸趨一致,不太可能很快結束。1988年,全球七大最富裕國家合占舉世收入的比例達到歷來最高的2/3,2010年降至一半。鮑德文說,未來數十年,這個比例很可能「繼續下降」。
相關數據不支持全球化趨勢可能逆轉的說法。根據聯合國的數據,全球的外資直接投資總額仍然低於2007年創下的2兆美元,但去年反彈,增加了9%,達到1.45兆美元。其中逾半數流向開發中國家,流向中國大陸的部分則達到近乎創紀錄的1240億美元,約比6年前增加50%。
即使美國占全球製造的比例增加,許多高薪的就業機會也不太可能回流。
麻省理工學院的萊斯與史迪法尼里檢視大約50家自稱要使就業機會回流美國的企業,發現其中多數尚未採取行動。萊斯說:「我們不認為這是實情。」
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